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RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OR RIGHTS OF USE?-THE NEED
FOR A NEW CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR LAND USE POLICY
LYNTON K. CALDWELL*

The conventional concept of "ownership" in land is detrimental to
rational land use, obstructive to the development of related environmental policies, and deceptive to those innocent individuals who would
trust it for protection. A new conceptual basis for land use law and
policy is required to reconcile the legitimate rights of the users of land
with the interest of society in maintaining a high quality environment.
This essay is intended to promote discussion of ways to reconcile these
objectives.'
Were the prevailing legal concepts of land ownership in the United
States not already established, it is highly improbable that any similar
body of doctrine would develop; rather, law more appropriate to
modern social and economic realities would evolve. The existing aggregation of laws and practices pertaining to land ownership and use
are beneficial primarily to persons interested in exploitation or litigation.
They provide little protection to the owner who lacks continuous
economic and legal counsel and who is unable personally to influence
political decisions. Moreover, the laws are even less helpful to communities and the general public in maintaining or restoring the quality
of the environment.
The persistence of archaic concepts of ownership rights is possibly
the principal obstacle to effective land use planning. A redefinition of
the rights flowing to an individual from his ownership in land is thus
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a necessary concomitant to land use planning, as well as to environmental management. Land law rooted in the conventions of Tudor
England cannot be expected to serve the needs of the post-industrial
society now emerging.
THE CONFUSING LEGACY OF CONVENTIONAL LAND

"OWNERSHIP"

In his essay on "Control of the Use of Land in English Law," W. 0.
Hart, then Clerk of the London County Council, observed: "The
English Law of real property never developed a true theory of ownership: tide was, and still is in essence, possessory and, moreover, relative
rather than absolute." 2 The prevailing principles, terminologies, and
deficiencies of English land law were transplanted to colonial America,
and, although changed circumstances led to changed concepts and
practices, the basic elements of law as interpreted in seventeenth and
eighteenth century England have continued to influence land law and
policy in the United States. The absence of an adequate theory of land
ownership and the -status of man-land relationships at the time of the
English colonization of America were basic forces which have- shaped
the tough resistance of the American political-legal system to effective
public control over the uses of land.
Throughout the history of law in Western society, property in land
has been distinguished from other forms of property, and rights of
ownership have been distinguished from rights of use. Rights pertaining to land have never been absolute in fact, and only rarely in theory.
As R. G. Crocombe observes, "The word ownership is misleading. A
person does not really own land: he owns rights in land." 3 Authority
over the uses and disposition of land has always been residual in society, whether represented by the community, the monarch, or the
state, and survives today in the concept of "eminent domain."
Except as allocated to specific persons for designated uses, land in
Anglo-Saxon England was "folcland," that is, belonging to the folk.4
2. LAw AND LAND 23 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
3. South Pacific Commission, Improving Land Tenure: A Survey of the Problems
of Adapting Customary Land Tenure Systems to Modem Economic Conditions in the
Region Served by the South Pacific Commission (1968).
4. For the history of English land law, see K. DiaBy, AN INTRODUCTION TO TIM HISTORY
OF Tm LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1875); W. HomsDWoRTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
To a LAND LAW (1927); A. SImpsoN, AN INTRODUCrION TO m HISTORY OF THm LAND
LAW (1961).
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Under feudalism, distinctions between the rights of ownership and of
use continued. As the English economy outgrew the provisions of the
common law for the adjudication of disputes over the uses of land,
however, the Court of Chancery, where adjudication was not rigidly
bound by precedent and tradition, assumed increasing importance. Although Parliament in 1535 enacted the Statute of Uses to clarify and
reconcile the complexities which had accumulated regarding rights
in the conveyance, utilization, and alienation of land, economic forces
and legal conservatism soon combined to diminish public benefit from
this legislation. As a result, the legacy of English land law that was
transmitted to the American colonies was highly technical, complex, and
unsystematic. Moreover, since real property law is a province of the
individual states, its unsystematic complexity has increased over the
years-its deficiencies remaining largely unresolved.
The period of the European colonization of America witnessed a
transition in the status of man-land relationships from vestiges of feudal
land tenure to the treatment of land as a marketable commodity. The
transition continued over several centuries and was influenced by economic forces and opportunities, rather than by a theory or master
plan. In America the great opportunity lay on the frontier, where land
was free from the traditional encumbrances of communal, seignorial,
or royal authority. The possession of land conferred security, economic
freedom, and social status, and the settler in America developed a deep
hunger for ownership of land such as he could never have hoped to
satisfy in the Old World. As an owner of land, he owed no obligation
to neighbor or posterity, and very little to the state. He came closer
to holding his land in "fee simple absolute" in a literal sense than anyone ever has under Anglo-American law.
Freed of the vestigial constraints of feudalism, the landholder in
America developed a tenacious attitude toward unfettered rights of
private land ownership. Most important of these was the right to treat
land as a commodity-to buy and sell, to speculate, and, under the right
of ownership, to take from the land whatever might be of value. This
strong sense of a private right of ownership combined with the abundance of unpreempted land and the disinclination of government to
interfere with land use to establish a tradition of private property in
land that has proved highly resistant to the imposition of public land
use controls. With a few exceptions pertaining chiefly to public nuisances, the rights of ownership fully covered the rights to use or to
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dispose. No other society appears to have gone so far in leaving the
fate of the land to the discretion of the private owner.
The development of public land use policy in the United States thus
began inauspiciously with a people emotionally committed to a myth
of private rights in land ownership. Although the pressures on available land caused by an increasing population and expanding economy
have somewhat eroded the commitment to this extreme form of economic individualism, public opinion has continued to adhere to its basic
tenets. Whether the refusal to examine underlying concepts stems from
a conscious fear of the effect of possible alternatives or merely from a
subconscious sense of tradition, the effect has been the frustration of
the rational use of land in the long-range public interest and oftentimes
the failure to protect the interests of the individual landowner.
ANOMALIES AND DEFICIENCIES OF THE OWNERSHIP CONCEPT

The case for conventional ownership of land cannot be made by reference to history or theory. The history of American land law and its
English antecedents makes evident that the right to hold, enjoy, develop,
and protect land, as well as to profit from its use, was never absolute nor
contingent upon ultimate legal ownership. The strongest defense for
the prevailing concept of land ownership is the empirical fact of its
existence. American folklore vaguely envisioned a moral right in lawful
possession that stood against all claims except those of the state for taxes
and those of creditors to whom the land had been mortgaged. The
doctrine of eminent domain (the government's power to claim private
land for use by or for the public), however, involved a concomitant
recognition that the ultimate owner of land was the society as a whole.
Moreover, the myth of a moral right to absolute possession is not generally supported by interpretations of natural law, nor uniformly by
the idea of absolute possession as a civil right. There are advantages in
the private ownership concept which account for its persistence, but not
all of these advantages are derived from the mere fact of ownership;
there are a number of contingencies for which ownership offers at best
a partial solution.
Legal fact and popular concept are seldom entirely consistent in any
field of law. With respect to land, the fixation on private property
has tended to obscure the reality that peaceful possession rests upon the
public affirmation and protection of whatever rights do in fact exist. If
privacy is an objective, land ownership does not assure it. The privacy
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of an owner may be invaded by public authorities for many reasons,
among them tax assessments and a myriad of public uses such as highways and airports. Nor is ownership a barrier against such effects of
modern civilization as noise, glare, litter, and atmospheric pollution.
The rights of ownership being conditional, the practical question of
the meaning of ownership consequently relates to the conditions under
which alleged rights of owners may be, or would be, enforceable. At
best, ownership supports a right to sue for damages or injunctive relief.
In most communities, defense against casual trespass is a responsibility
of the owner, not of the local government through the police, and the
owner's ability to enforce his rights is limited by law, and often by
circumstance.
It is logically anomalous to concepts of private ownership in land, but
nevertheless a fact, that many state laws confer upon privately owned
utilities the power of eminent domain over privately owned real property. If the exercise of this public power is essential to the siting of
power plants and the routing of transmission lines, it is dubious that the
generation and distribution of electrical energy is an appropriate activity
for private enterprise. It would be more consistent with popular concepts of private property rights if eminent domain were invoked only
by agents of the public. Logically, the sites and routes of power lines,
pipelines, and generating plants would be publicly owned; if operation
was through private enterprise, the use of leases or franchises to the
utility from the government would be appropriate.
Just as conventional concepts of land ownership cannot assure privacy,
they cannot guarantee personal and economic security. It is not uncommon for an individual to be murdered or robbed on his own land, the
market value of land may fall as well as rise, and the burdens of ownership may be increased through taxation and special assessments. The
relative permanence of land does make it acceptable collateral for loans,
and this economic advantage, together with the relative stability of land
values, offers the most reliable benefit to be obtained from ownership
as presently defined. Any such benefit, however, is obtainable only to
the extent that land is treated as a commodity and is enjoyed exclusively
by the owner, often at the expense of his neighbors and society generally.
Although some laws governing nuisances and threats to public safety
have traditionally limited the lawful uses to which an owner may put
his land, these limitations pertain to the use, and not the ownership, of
land. It is at this point, where rights of use are claimed to follow from
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the rights of ownership, that legal and political conflict over the rights
of use characteristically arise. Although the principal advantage of land
ownership has been in concomitant freedoms of use, especially to sell
or otherwise convey for a consideration, the most numerous and flagrant abuses of land tend to be associated with its treatment as a commodity. Some of the worst practices are perpetrated by corporations
engaged in land sales and speculation. Ironically, the same transaction
by such an enterprise which proves economically profitable to a stockholder may, unknown to him at the time, result in a serious loss of what
he considers valuable environmental amenities.
The composite picture of land ownership rights in the United States
is anything but consistent. The basic deficiency in the law of land
ownership lies in the inadequacy of its philosophic foundation. It is
difficult to build a logical case for, or against, a body of law which
has grown, virtually ad hoc, in response to pressures and events. As
K. E. Digby observed with respect to the evolution of the English law
of real property: "[T]he nature and attributes of the various classes
of rights are to be accounted for by reference rather to their history
than to any principles of jurisprudence." ' Digby concluded that the
confusion engendered by provisions of the Statute of Uses "renders any
real simplification of the law of real property impossible, without a
more thorough rebuilding of the whole structure from its foundations
and the substitution of a systematic or scientific for a historical classification . . . ." ' Since Digby's time, significant rationalization, if not
any real simplification, has occurred in English law, notably through
the Town and County Planning Acts. In the United States, however,
there are as many different systems of land law as there are states and
their 10,000 local subdivisions, with additional legislation pertaining to
federal lands and territories. Of course, the mere fact of variation
does not in itself imply deficiency; it does, however, reflect the absence
in American society of a guiding philosophy of man-land relationships.
The closest Anglo-American law could come to developing an adequate theoretical foundation for rights of land ownership and use was
a very inadequate approximation to such a theory provided by the
doctrine of natural law. The most influential American expositor of
natural law doctrine in relation to land was Thomas Jefferson.7 His
5. K. DiGnY, supranote 4, at vi.
6. Id.
7. See Caldwell, The Jurisprudence of Thomas Jefferson, 18 IN. L.J. 193 (1943).
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opinions, however, tended to be broadly philosophical and political,
rather than more narrowly jurisprudential, and frequently embraced
contradictory propositions for which he offered no resolution. Jefferson argued that the system of land inherited from Norman England
could not be applied to colonial America without the consent of its inhabitants. He compared the European settlers of America to the Saxon
invaders of Britain, declaring: "Their own blood was spilt in acquiring
lands for their settlements, their own fortunes expended in making settlement effectual; for themselves they fought, for themselves they conquered, and for themselves alone they have a right to hold." 8
Jefferson thus alleged that the British crown had no claim to title of
unoccupied lands in the colonies and that their use and disposition by
the Americans was justified by conquest and occupancy. This taking of
possession of unoccupied land appeared to be a natural right, but, reasoning that even natural rights could be abridged or modified with the consent of the people or their deputies, Jefferson believed that the personal
ownership of property must be deemed a civil rather than natural right.
Although he believed that society should guarantee to everyone "a free
exercise of his industry, and the fruits acquired by it," 9 he held that the
rights of an individual, natural or civil, never extended to harming the
equal rights of others.
Moreover, Jefferson did not believe that the civil law of one generation could bind succeeding generations. "Each generation," he wrote,
"has the usufruct of the earth during the period of its continuance.
Vhen it ceases to exist, the usufruct passes on to the succeeding generation, free and unincumbered, and so on successively, from one generation
to another forever." 10 Beyond the obvious consideration that every
generation to some extent reinterprets existing policies and laws, this
philosophic proposition was hardly applicable in the practical world and
was clearly not supportive of conventional practices regarding land
ownership.
Thus, the man who, more than any other, may be described as the
father of American democratic ideals left a confusing legacy of thought
regarding the rights of the individual and the rights of society vis-a-vis
the ownership and use of land. No other public figure in the formative
years of the nation had greater concern for land policy and for the rights
8. 2 ThE WoRxs oF THoMAs JEFFERsoN 64-65 (P. Ford ed. 1904).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 298 (letter to John Wayles Eppes, June 24, 1813).
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of the individual farmer and homesteader. The persistence of his ideas
in a populous, industrial, and interdependent society has had effects he
could hardly have imagined and many of which have been utterly inconsistent -with his values. Nevertheless, his insistence upon the need
for the adaptability of law and institutions to the changing circumstances
of society is the clearest and most pertinent contribution of his thought
to the present debate over land use policy and law.
NEEDED:

A NEW CONCEPTUAL BASIS

The conventional belief that land may be "owned" as of "right"
rather than as a socially derived privilege is undercut by a number of
considerations, several of which have shaped land use arrangements in
other societies. Common among primitive and pastoral peoples, for
example, is the belief that because no man made the land, no man may
possess it as his "own." This viewpoint, which has been adopted in
some sectors of the ecology/environmental quality movement, is totally unrelated to Marxist theory, being derived from a theory of manenvironment relations rather than from socio-economic philosophy. Although in exceptional instances land may be "made" in the sense of being
made available for human use through human effort, any one individual
rarely is equal to the task. Thus, the polders of the Netherlands, which
were socially engineered, "belong" to the nation.
A second consideration which has persisted throughout the evolution
of the law of real property involves the contrast of the transiency of man
in time and space against the relative permanence of land. This consideration, indeed, is the basis for distinctions between real and personal
property. Since real property cannot be separated from its environment
and since successive generations will depend upon it for sustenance, the
integrity of the land and its ecosystems demands that the arbitrary personal use of any part of it be subject to social interposition if the acts
of an owner pose a threat to the continuing welfare of the community.
From this consideration follows the principle of stewardship, under
which ownership or possession of land is viewed as a trust, with attendant obligations to future generations as well as to the present."
The ownership concept as it developed in the United States emphasized
the rights of personal possession but suggested no attitude of responsi11. See C. LinLE & R. BuamPAP, STwEAmwsam: THE LAD, THE LANDOWNER, TH
Mmopotas (1965) (prepared for landowners in the New York Metropolitan region by
the Open Space Action Committee).
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bility to the public or to posterity. Beyond the law, however, there
has been recognition of an ethical concept of stewardship. Although
the roots of this attitude, which at times assumes a semireligious or
mystical character, 12 are ancient and multicultural, its assumptions regarding man as belonging to the totality of nature are more consistent
with reality as revealed by science than are the technical principles of
judicial logic evolved in response to the exigencies of economics and
political power.
A fourth consideration with respect to land ownership, having no historical tradition, is that the ownership concept developed under relatively constant social conditions entailing no massive rapid changes in
land value or usage. In America the relative abundance of cheap land
and the minimal demands of society upon landowners continued from
the time of the European settlements until the late nineteenth century.
By the mid-twentieth century, however, radical changes in man-land
relationships were effected by great increases in population and per
capita wealth. The impact of technology upon land use was no less
dramatic, new modes of transportation making every part of the nation
readily accessible to popular use and exploitation. Air-conditioning and
cheap energy altered human ecology and land use patterns over large
areas of the nation. Following World War II, the escalating market
value of land had an impact on American society equalled only by the
concomitant destruction of the landscape and the generally disastrous
dispersion of housing and commercial activities over the countryside.
The cumulative effect of these changes has been to bring into question
the social desirability of the rights of land ownership as presently construed. The case for ownership of land would be stronger were the
personal freedom and independence of most Americans actually dependent upon it. The present status of land ownership, however, is
beneficial chiefly to developers and speculators, as well as to exploiters
of values attached to the land. While to the individual home owner
mere ownership offers little more than the illusion of security, the advantages accrue to the indifferent despoiler of the land and landscape
whose interest is with neither land nor environment but rather with
the economic returns from his land transactions.
Together, these considerations suggest that a more appropriate mechanism than conventional ownership is required to govern and ensure the
right to use land in particular ways and for particular purposes and the
12. See L. Ba=Y, ThE HoLY EA'm (1919).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:759

ability to obtain reliable protection, consistent with the public interest,
from invasion of such right. Systematic means are needed to balance the
various uses of land in society. The proposition guiding any such alternative should be that, next to man, land is the fundamental element
of the human environment and the one most important in shaping the
character of society.
The need for a change in laws governing land arises as a concomitant
of other major social changes. English land law experienced periods of
major change at critical junctures in English history. The change from
a communal to a feudal land system followed the Norman Conquest and
from feudal to commercial, illustrated by the Statute of Uses, marked
the birth of modern England. The third dramatic change occurred when England reached "saturation" with respect to demands
upon land and when social and ecological considerations gained ascendancy over market considerations. The series of Property Acts taking
effect in 1926 and the subsequent Town and County Planning Acts
have restated and restricted the rights of the landowner, although, in a
characteristically English manner, the changes have been incremental
and reformist rather than expressive of a radical new ideology.
English land law was transplanted to America at a time when the
powers inherent in private land ownership had reached a zenith. The
conditions favoring free exercise of such powers have continued for over
300 years, becoming deeply ingrained in American ethics, attitudes,
and expectations. Radical changes in the American economy and lifestyles in the mid-twentieth century found the nation poorly equipped
by psychology or by law to cope with the rapidly mounting problems of
land use. The persistence of the traditional land ownership concept in
the face of such vastly altered societal circumstances represents perhaps
the most costly deficiency of the traditional concept-its inability to
adapt to meet changing circumstances. Cheap energy, together with a
free market in land, have encouraged the disintegration of cities and the
sprawl of economic activities and settlements across the country, entailing heavy fixed costs in public services and transportation of people
and materials and involving attendant losses of environmental amenities.
The energy crisis of recent months demonstrates the manner in which
the decentralizing effect of land use policies has defeated the efficient
use of mass transit in suburban areas.
The cumulative effect of the most recent quarter-century of private
land use decisions has been the disintegration of the physical structure
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of American society. These decisions have, of course, been influenced,
often inadvertently, by public policies relating to taxes, credit, highway
construction, low-cost housing, and civil rights. An interlocking set of
conditions and policies devised to deal with them have converged to
destroy urban as well as rural environments and to overwhelm the
burgeoning suburbs with expenses and problems. It is in the face of this
disintegration of the social fabric that land use planning and the control of urban growth have at last become major subjects of political
concern. In the absence of a fundamental change in the rights of land
ownership, however, serious efforts to implement rational land use
planning legislation are likely to be ineffectual.
SoME

ELEMENTS OF A RATIONAL POLICY

In the search for alternative principles of land policy, it is essential
that temporary economic advantages (or disadvantages) to particular
individuals be distinguished from definable long-range benefits satisfying
social and ecological criteria. It also is necessary to distinguish theory
from actual effect. Failure to make these distinctions would almost
certainly increase the probability of opposition from persons owning
land even though many of the traditional rights of ownership would be
replaced by rights of use. If those rights of ownership presumed to ensure the security and responsibility of the individual landowner could
be maintained more effectively in some other way, there might be a
generally recognized advantage in abandoning the concept of land
ownership. Thus, assured protection of the socially and ecologically
harmless rights which now are allegedly protected by ownership would
certainly be a prerequisite to the willing acceptance by landowners of
any new set of legal principles under which land itself is not owned.
A second prerequisite would be provision against the "tragedy of the
commons" effect.1 3 Land, as such, would be no more "ownable" than
air or water, but the uses of land would be the object of law and of
rights, as presently is the case with water. The objective would not be
to substitute bureaucratic for commercial decisionmaking over land
use but rather to clarify and specify this decisional process, as well as
to assure more adequate protection to the legitimate interests of individuals and the present and long-term needs of society.
Following are some propositions, none of which is intrinsically new,
which might serve toward these purposes. Any element of novelty lies
13. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Conmons, ScmNcE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
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in the combination of these propositions to form a new conceptual basis
for land law and policy, the goal being the construction of a foundation
in jurisprudence for the environmental policies which must be devised
to safeguard our future in a finite world.
First, rights of ownership should be redefined to apply not to land
itself but to specific rights to occupy or use particular parcels of land,
or both, in accordance with publicly established criteria. Rights to use
might be bought and sold, and could confer possession, but the land
itself would cease to be the representative symbol of these rights. The
ultimate repository for such rights would be in society, and their administration, while through government, could involve extensive citizen
participation.
Second, rights of occupancy would be defined by law, with land
classified according to its economic and ecological capabilities, and
would be regulated by provisions specifying the obligations of occupancy and governing the acquisition of additional rights. The term
"rights" would encompass those activities in relation to the land in
which the occupant or user might freely engage, as well as those aspects
of privacy and of security from external damage or annoyance which
society through government would undertake to defend and protect.
Obligations concomitant to custody of land would include, in addition
to traditional restrictions against public nuisance, measures designed to
protect air and water quality, the integrity of ecosystems, and the character of the landscape, whether manmade or natural. The classification
system, allocating specific rights to particular areas or parcels of land,
would be the product of public planning. For any given piece of land,
only those rights allocated to it could be exercised, although not all
available rights would have to be exercised. Furthermore, a purchaser
might buy some but not all of the rights pertaining to a parcel of land;
he could, for example, purchase the right to farm without also obtaining
the rights to mine or to develop the land. The combination of rights
and obligations thus defined could apply to communities and public
authorities, as well as individuals and corporations. Such application
would be especially important with respect to land used for public
works, such as power plants, energy transmission lines, airports, highways, military installations, scientific research, recreation, historic
preservation, and natural resources development.
Finally, taxation would apply to the economic value of the rights
actually possessed and exercised, not to the land itself or in anticipation
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of rights that might be obtained for the particular piece of land. The
tax rate could be adjusted to compensate the public for any burden,
such as air pollution, that a particular land use might place upon a community. This system would put an end to the practice of assessing
land at its presumed market value regardless of its use. The owner of
the right to farm a tract of land, for example, could be taxed only in
relation to that right, even though the farm was surrounded by land
for which highly taxed development rights had been granted. In addition, since capital gains in land per se would not be obtainable, the owner
of the right to farm a piece of land could not follow the present practice of holding land off the market in anticipation of an increase in its
value. He could not develop the land or sell development rights to
others unless he possessed such rights, and any changes in the use of
land not included among the rights already possessed by the user would
require purchase of additional rights from the appropriate public
authority. Conversion of farmland to an industrial site, for instance,
would require the purchase of a right or franchise to develop. The assessment of rights would reflect the profitability of the development
and the costs and benefits to the community. In this regard, the right to
remove minerals, soil, or timber from land would require conditional
permits drafted to protect ecological and amenity values and to ensure
the economical handling of the materials. This arrangement would replace existing severance taxation.
A major objective of these changes in land law would be to assure
that publicly created values in land would accrue to the public. Thus,
increases in the value of land at newly constructed interchanges on
interstate highways would afford no opportunity for profit to the existing land users. Whether development rights or franchises would be
granted would depend upon considerations of areal physical planning
and public necessity and convenience. A development franchise could
not be granted without an environmental impact study and, if granted,
could stipulate style of construction, siting, landscaping, and provision
for traffic flow and public utilities.
Surrender of development rights, and avoidance of attendant financial
liabilities, would require restoration of land to a condition at least equivalent, in most cases, to its predevelopment status. Derelict billboards,
abandoned buildings, mines, quarries, and other residuals of discontinued
development would be taxed at rates sufficient to compel their owners
to undertake remedial or restorative measures. The intent of these
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provisions would be to make development more responsible and more
carefully considered. It would also make development less spontaneous
and less profitable to would-be speculators. Special provision should be
made, however, to prevent the destruction of potentially useful structures or of buildings of artistic or historic value. Certificates of exemption might be issued to relieve owners of these nonproductive "improvements" from taxation at development rates.
A secondary purpose of the proposed changes would be prevention
of socially and ecologically harmful speculation in development. Although a grant of development rights would confer limited authority
to change the uses of land in certain ways, major environmental changes,
such as development of a shopping center involving public services
and transportation, would require an additional franchise. If, as has
been suggested, development taxes must be paid as long as a right to
development is held, developers could not escape errors of judgment or
miscarriage of projects merely by abandoning them. Until the development rights were sold or surrendered, they would continue as liabilities
accruing against the holder. Some form of public receivership would
doubtless be necessary to take custody of abandoned property and to
restore the land with funds obtained from forfeited equities or from
penalties for the failure to restore the land.
A virtue of the foregoing approach to land use policy is that decisions
affecting the public would in effect become public decisions, a circumstance that occurs imperfectly, if at all, under the laws currently prevailing in most states. The decisional process could be made more open
and explicit than generally is the case under the system of private land
ownership. The "rights to use" approach would direct public action
away from litigation and toward planning and administration.
Among the probable effects of removing land per se from the market
and from treatment as a commodity would be a temporary price instability until completion of redefinition of rights in terms of use. Although in the interim prices of land would probably be depressed, a
traumatic effect on the real estate economy might be avoided if the
existing market value were redefined to be the value of its present use.
The immediate effect of the proposed changes on expansive economic
growth would be negative; the long-range impact, however, would be
to stabilize economic activity and reduce the incidence of failure in
land development projects. In terms of the effect upon the public
revenues, taxation of land would be replaced by taxation of rights ini
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land. Structures built on the land could, as at present, be taxed separately. The incidence of these taxes would require careful study, since there
would be no inevitable direction in which the tax burden could be
shifted.
FEASIBILITY OF THESE PROPOSITIONS

The principal effect of the foregoing propositions would be to take
from private persons, individual or corporate, the power to effect significant alterations in the environment without public consent. It does
not follow, however, that the power of environmental planning and
management would be transferred to public bureaucracy. Use of citizen
boards of review and open planning sessions, as well as provision for
input from science and the design arts, could result in more socially
and ecologically responsible land use decisions than might be expected
under the existing technicalities of land use law.
The objectives of these propositions are, in a very fundamental sense,
conservative. They are intended to preserve and to conserve, to encourage and to enforce responsibility toward society and posterity, and
to reduce the likelihood of rash and destructive uses of land and resources. Moreover, they are intended to do these things without loss
to the real freedoms currently enjoyed under ownership of land, except
where their exercise would be prejudicial to society.
It should be apparent that the proposal to replace rights of land
ownership with rights of use implies the possibility of major changes in
the power structure of society and in the processes of decisionmaking
with respect to land use. These changes are certainly not imminent; to
what extent might they become feasible?
The propositions which have been suggested may, in certain respects,
appear similar to those advanced more than a century ago by Henry
George. 1" The philosophical foundation of both approaches is ecological and stems from the belief that, in a logical and meaningful sense,
land, as such, can no more be owned than air or water. The purpose of
the propositions advanced in this Article, however, is more limited than
that of George's, and the alternatives are more numerous, more complex,
and less definite.
No general reformist device such as the "single tax" is proposed, nor
would the tax on uses suggested in this Article necessarily force land
14. See H. GERE, OUR LAND Am LAND PoLicy (1871); H. GEORGE, PRomRESS AND
PovErMY (1879).
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into economic productivity or cause it to be withheld from use. It is
the value of the use that would be taxed, not the value of the land.
Payments for rights of use correspond to Henry George's "rent," and,
although no claim is made that this form of taxation is necessarily more
equitable than those presently practiced in the United States, it may be
suggested that the effects of taxation might be clarified and criteria for
equitability more adequately defined.
Whatever its deficiencies, the existing system of land ownership, and
its variations and modifications, has produced relationships and results
that are generally, if imperfectly, understood. Remedies exist for most
abuses, although their practical availability is often exTensive and belated. Substitution of another system of law for man-land relationships
will not be easily accomplished. This Article has advanced the proposition that the changes which have been occurring in modern society
have made the present land ownership system increasingly disfunctional
to rational economic and ecological objectives. Nevertheless, recourse
to a different system should be undertaken only after careful study of
the probable consequences of such a change.
The importance of research on the relationships between land use
and the laws governing proprietary land units has been stressed by D. R.
Denman, Professor of Land Economy at the University of Cambridge."
Study of the proprietary structures in land and of relationships between
the proprietary land unit (ownership) and the enterprise unit (use)
has been undertaken by the National Institute of Agrarianical Research,
Rural Economy and Research in France. 16 The problem of finding an
optimal relationship between rights of ownership and rights of use thus
is not unique to the United States.
Professor Denman in his inaugural lecture declared: "Property rights
in land or rights analogous to them are, in the last analysis, the only
power by which men can execute positive plans for the use of land and
natural resources." 17 Denman argues persuasively that much of the
frustration and failure in present land use planning has resulted from the
failure of planners to recognize adequately "the positive influence of
property rights in land" and that "the planning process has not super15. D. DENMAN,
LEme-m (1969).
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16. See Brun, Droits de Propriete et Droits d'Usage du Sal Agricole: Un Essai de
Description Economie Rurale (No. 75, 1968).
17. D. DENMAN, supra note 15, at 2.
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seded the property sanction." I The apparent need is to find an appropriate institutional means for reconciling the right of the individual
to own with the need of society to plan. Rights of ownership in land
as they have been conventionally interpreted in the United States have
not met this need. The vise course would therefore seem to be to
identify those analogous rights which, even if retaining the terminology
of private property rights in land, would redefine those rights to serve
better the public interest.

18. Id.

